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1 
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
Professor Nancy Gertner, Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School, served as 
Judge on the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts from 1994 
until 2011. She has dedicated her career–before, during, and after serving on the bench–to 
the proper administration of justice. She has lectured around the world on the topic of 
judicial independence and judicial accountability, and her interest in this case springs 
from her scholarly and professional interest in the role of courts in creating and 
administering legal rules in a democracy. In 2008, the American Bar Association 
recognized her contributions to advancing human rights and civil liberties by naming her 
the recipient of its Thurgood Marshall Award. 
Professor Kent Greenfield is a leading scholar of corporate governance and 
corporate accountability.  He is Professor of Law and Law Fund Research Scholar at 
Boston College, and a former chair of the Section on Business Associations of the 
American Association of Law Schools.  In his article Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder 
Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce 
International Law Norms), 87 Va. L. Rev. 1279 (2001), and in his book The Failure of 
Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (Chicago University 
Press, 2006), he first articulated the argument that Delaware corporate law provides a 
mechanism for shareholders to ensure that corporations abide by international law. 
The amici file this brief on their own behalf.  No party’s counsel authored the 
brief in whole or in part.  No party or party’s counsel contributed money that was 
 
2 
intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.  No person—other than the amici or its 
counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 There is no question that corporations chartered in Delaware have a duty to obey 
the law. There is also no question that such duty is enforceable within corporate law, both 
vis-à-vis fiduciaries and the company itself. With fiduciaries, unlawful behavior is a 
breach of fiduciary duty. With the company itself, illegal acts are ultra vires. Ensuring 
that Delaware companies and their fiduciaries maintain respect for the rule of law has, 
laudably, been a focus of the Delaware Chancery for some time. To satisfy the 
requirement that the demanded inspection have a “proper purpose,” a plaintiff only needs 
to show a “credible basis” that illegality for which Hershey is responsible has occurred or 
is occurring. 
 Delaware courts have not to date made clear the responsibility of companies for 
illegalities committed by suppliers and business partners. Certainly a company cannot 
protect itself from legal accountability simply by hiding behind an assertion that an 
illegality was committed by a separate legal entity or middleman. Rather, the 
determination of legal accountability necessarily depends on a more nuanced calculus, 
and good corporate governance—not to mention fairness—will require there to be 
something of a continuum of responsibility.  
 The proper calibration of this continuum of accountability will require careful 
deliberation by the Delaware courts, the nation’s most important judicial monitor of 
multinational companies. These calibrations will take time, and will depend on the 
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equities and facts of specific cases. But the Delaware courts cannot shy away from this 
important task. 
 Establishing this continuum is a matter of increasing importance for Delaware 
courts, because a growing number of US companies chartered in Delaware are engaged in 
business practices globally. Also, an increasing number of Delaware companies are 
working through contractors and middlemen to occupy stages of the supply chain that 
would have traditionally been occupied by the company itself or by wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. The instant case is a perfect example of both the need for companies to be 
mindful of their legal and ethical responsibilities in a global economy, and the need for 
the Delaware Chancery to continue its efforts to delineate the responsibilities of Delaware 
corporations to respect the rule of law wherever and through whatever vehicle they do 
business.  
 The reality of chocolate production in western Africa, linked with the dominant 
role of defendant Hershey corporation in the world chocolate market, gives rise to a 
more-than-reasonable presumption that Hershey is toward the top end of the continuum 
of accountability for illegal acts, providing a more than “credible basis” for the 
shareholder plaintiff’s claim for inspection. It may be impossible to know at this juncture 
the precise extent or nature of the board’s knowledge of, or the company’s role in, 
furthering or benefiting from the ongoing illegal use of child labor or from child 
trafficking. But that is exactly the purpose of a § 220 inspection.  
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ARGUMENT 
I. DELAWARE CORPORATIONS HAVE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW, 
ENFORCEABLE THROUGH CORPORATE LAW, AND DETERMINING 
WHETHER ILLEGALITY IS OCCURRING IS A PROPER PURPOSE FOR A 
SECTION 220 INSPECTION. 
 As the Delaware courts have long recognized, corporations chartered in Delaware 
have a duty to obey the law. There is no question that such duty is enforceable within 
corporate law, both vis-à-vis fiduciaries and the company itself. Indeed, ensuring that 
Delaware companies and their fiduciaries maintain respect for the rule of law has, 
laudably, been a focus of the Delaware Chancery for some time.  
 With fiduciaries–directors, officers, and senior management–ensuring the 
company acts lawfully is a material component of fiduciary duty. In re Massey Energy 
Co., 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“A fiduciary of a Delaware 
corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by knowingly causing it to seek 
profit by violating the law.”); In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 
4826104, at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“Illegal corporate conduct is not loyal 
corporate conduct.”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A. 2d 27, 67 (Del. 
2006) (“A failure to act in good faith may be shown . . . where the fiduciary acts with the 
intent to violate applicable positive law.”); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing the 
corporation to violate the positive laws it is obligated to obey.”). 
 Illegalities are not only enforceable by means of a fiduciary duty suit against 
individuals. Because Delaware corporations (including defendant The Hershey 
Company) are chartered only for “lawful” acts or activity, 8 Del. C. § 101(b), illegalities 
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committed by the company are considered ultra vires and may be the proper source of 
both direct shareholder suits and injunctive actions by the state Attorney General. 
Delaware law is explicit on this point. A “lack of capacity or power may be asserted . . .  
[i]n a proceeding by a stockholder against the corporation to enjoin the doing of any act 
or acts” or “[i]n a proceeding by the Attorney General to dissolve the corporation, or to 
enjoin the corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business.” 8 Del. C. § 124. 
See generally Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate 
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law 
Norms), 87 Va. L. Rev. 1279 (2001) (“corporations are not authorized under their 
charters to commit crimes or otherwise act unlawfully. . . . [B]ecause unlawful acts are 
ultra vires . . . such activities become subject to the enforcement powers of corporate 
law.”); Stephen M. Flanagan, 7A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS sec. 3400, at 12 (1997) (“If an act or contract is illegal . . . it is doubtless 
ultra vires in the broad sense as being ‘without power.’”). See also Adam Sulkowski & 
Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of Class Actions, 
Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for Controlling 
Corporate Behavior, 79 St. John’s L. Rev. 929, 949 (2006) (“a court could be asked to 
enjoin the illegal conduct or to exercise its powers in equity and order the company to 
achieve certain benchmarks or engage in certain remedial or preventative programs to 
prevent further illegalities”); Adam J. Sulkowski, Ultra Vires Statutes: Alive, Kicking, 
and a Means of Circumventing the Scalia Standing Gauntlet in Environmental Litigation, 
14 J. Envir. Law & Litig. 75, 103-107 (2009) (reviewing modern cases). The ALI 
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Principles of Corporate Governance provide additional support for this position. “[T]he 
corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [i]s obliged, to the same extent as a natural 
person, to act within the boundaries set by law.” PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1) (1992). The comment to 
that section clarifies that “[t]he appropriate vehicle to remedy an alleged violation of the 
principles stated in § 2.01 would be an action for injunctive or other equitable relief by a 
shareholder.” Id. § 2.01 cmt. j.  
 This Court’s recent comments in In re Massey Energy Co., supra, go to this point: 
Delaware law does not charter law breakers. Delaware law allows 
corporations to pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical 
statutory floor, which is the requirement that Delaware corporations only 
pursue “lawful business” by “lawful acts.” 
 
In re Massey Energy Co., supra, at *20. See also Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 
1114 n.45 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[i]n the context of defining void acts, ultra vires acts . . . 
include[] acts specifically prohibited by the corporation’s charter, for which no implicit 
authority may be rationally surmised, or those acts contrary to basic principles of 
fiduciary law”).  
 In other words, the corporation is empowered under Delaware law only to 
conduct lawful activities, and when it engages in unlawful activities as an entity it is 
acting beyond its chartered powers. The ultra vires doctrine may be extinct with regard to 
limiting corporations to engage in only certain lines of business. But with regard to 
unlawful activities, a vestige of the doctrine survives. As one of us said over a decade 
ago, 
 
7 
While the [ultra vires] doctrine has fallen away in the main, loosening 
corporations from the obligation of staying within narrowly prescribed 
purposes, a remaining sliver of the doctrine seeks to ensure that corporate 
activities stay within legal bounds. The existence of such a doctrine is 
consistent with statutory texts, typical articles of incorporation, 
background norms of contract law, and with what the major firm 
stakeholders would want in an ex ante negotiation. 
 
Greenfield, 87 Va. L. Rev. at 1351.  
 The implication of the requirement that corporations not engage in illegalities in 
this case cannot be overstated. Shareholders have an interest in monitoring whether the 
corporation is acting unlawfully even if there is insufficient evidence to show that 
directors or other fiduciaries should be subject to personal liability for a failure to monitor 
under Caremark and Stone v Ritter. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 
959 (Del.Ch.1996); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.2006). In order to show a 
“proper purpose” for its inspection demand, 8 Del. C. § 220, it is emphatically not 
necessary for the shareholder plaintiff in this case to show that any individual fiduciary 
stood in breach of those duties, because even if a fiduciary has not breached her duty to 
monitor, the company itself may nevertheless be acting ultra vires. And such activity 
would be a concern of shareholders, as it would provide a basis for a shareholder 
injunctive actions or enforcement actions by public officials or agencies. So to satisfy the 
requirement that the demanded inspection have a “proper purpose,” a plaintiff should 
only be required to show a “credible basis” that illegality for which Hershey is 
responsible has occurred or is occurring, not a “credible basis” that a fiduciary is in 
breach. 
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II. THE COURT OF CHANCERY SHOULD USE THIS CASE TO DEVELOP 
THE LAW SURROUNDING THE LIABILITY OF DELAWARE 
CORPORATIONS FOR ILLEGALITIES COMMITTED OVERSEAS AND BY 
THIRD PARTIES.   
 The reality of cocoa farming and chocolate production in western Africa raises a 
compelling inference that significant illegality is occurring. While it is impossible at this 
stage of the litigation for us—or this Court—properly to evaluate the evidence, it 
certainly appears very likely that cocoa and cocoa-related products are being produced in 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, two important sources for Hershey, in violation of international 
law as well as of the laws of those countries and of the United States. Moreover, given 
the dominant role of defendant Hershey corporation in the world chocolate market, and 
its admitted sourcing of cocoa from the region in question, it is reasonable to doubt 
defendant Hershey’s assertions that it is not in any way knowledgeable of, willfully blind 
to, or complicit with such illegalities. 
 In all fairness, however, there are two gaps in the argument that would hold 
Hershey and its directors responsible under Delaware corporate law for the illegalities 
alleged in the complaint. The first gap is informational, and the second is doctrinal. 
 Informational. The nature of the illegalities alleged, the business model of cocoa 
production that relies on mostly family farms, and the foreign and distant locale of the 
alleged illegalities all make it quite difficult to gather evidence about the role of Hershey 
in furthering the illegalities alleged or benefitting therefrom. The extent of knowledge or 
involvement of Hershey management and of The Hershey Corporation in these 
illegalities is yet murky. But gathering this kind of information is a very purpose of a § 
220 inspection.  
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 As argued above, it is a proper purpose for shareholders to concern themselves 
with whether the company is engaging in, or is complicit in, unlawful activities. 
Shareholders have standing to concern themselves with possible illegalities not only 
because such illegalities are ultra vires and would give rise to injunctive actions brought 
by shareholders or the Attorney General. Shareholders also have standing to concern 
themselves with possible illegalities because of the potential of serious reputational harm 
to the company in which they have invested. 
 This case is an apt example of the importance of a § 220 inspection. Given the 
defendant’s laudable history and values, the high value of its brands, and its beloved 
status with children in the United States, the company would suffer devastating 
reputational harm if a public agency in the United States or elsewhere initiated 
proceedings against the company on the basis of the illegalities alleged in the complaint. 
The shareholders have a right (assuming the “credible basis” standard is met) to use a § 
220 inspection to investigate proactively the nature of Hershey’s knowledge or 
complicity in the alleged illegality, both to protect their own interests as shareholders and 
to protect the company itself. 
 Doctrinal. Though the matters alleged in this case are terribly serious, this suit is 
more important than the merits of this sole dispute. In an increasingly global world 
economy, Delaware corporations are involving themselves more deeply in the laws and 
cultures of other national economies. As a result, they will increasingly be required to 
answer to a range of legal and cultural obligations that may be unfamiliar. Also, because 
of the nature of the global economy, an increasing number of Delaware companies are 
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working through subcontractors, suppliers, and middlemen to occupy stages of their 
production and supply chains that would have traditionally been occupied by the 
company itself or by wholly-owned subsidiaries. Because of this, Delaware corporations 
are increasingly asked to answer for behavior that may not be their own in a strict sense, 
but on which their international reputation and their shareholder and customer 
relationships rely. 
 Meanwhile, the Delaware judiciary has not yet defined the contours of 
corporations’ responsibility for illegalities committed by suppliers, business partners, or 
other third parties. Certainly a company and its board cannot protect itself from legal 
accountability simply by hiding behind an assertion that an illegality was committed by a 
separate legal entity or middleman. Rather, the determination of legal accountability will 
necessarily depend on a more nuanced calculus, and good corporate governance—not to 
mention fairness—will require there to be something of a continuum of responsibility.  
 On one end will be situations in which there is de facto unity between a Delaware 
corporation and a subcontractor, supplier, or middleman acting illegally, or when a 
Delaware corporation is acting in partnership with entities acting illegally. The 
responsible end of the continuum would also capture situations in which a Delaware 
corporation and its fiduciaries were knowingly complicit in such illegalities, even if 
managerial unity or partnership did not exist. On the other end of the continuum, it would 
be unjust for corporations and their management to be held responsible for the behavior 
and decisions of independent actors committing illegalities without the complicity, 
benefit, or knowledge of the corporation. 
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 The proper calibration of this continuum of accountability will require careful 
deliberation by the Delaware courts, the nation’s most important judicial monitor of 
multinational companies. In establishing the levels of accountability, attention will need 
to be paid to both the ex ante effects of legal rules on behavior, and on the ex post 
considerations of fairness and just desert. These fine calibrations will take time, and will 
depend on the equities and facts of specific cases. But the Delaware courts cannot shy 
away from this important task. 
 The calibration of this continuum is a matter of increasing importance for 
Delaware courts. In a sense, as Delaware corporations become more global, the Delaware 
judiciary must concern itself with the global implications of its corporate law doctrines.  
(Chancellor Strine has been vocal on this front. See Transcript of Oral Argument and The 
Court’s Ruling in In re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No.6476-CS, 
February 6, 2013 (available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2013/02/puda-
case.pdf)). 
 The instant case is a perfect example of the need for boards and the corporations 
they steward to be mindful of their legal and ethical responsibilities in a global economy, 
and the need for the Delaware Chancery to continue its efforts to delineate the 
responsibilities of Delaware corporations to respect the rule of law wherever they do 
business. With evidence of the realities of chocolate production in Western Africa, 
coupled with the dominant role of the Hershey corporation in that market, the 
shareholders have certainly presented sufficient information to satisfy the requirement of 
showing a “proper purpose” for such inspection and “credible basis” to believe that 
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mismanagement or wrongdoing has occurred.  8 Del. C. § 220; Seinfeld v. Verizon 
Comm. Inc., 909 A.2d 117 (Del. 2006). Once the inspection is ordered and completed, 
the shareholders and the court will have a much greater ability to evaluate where on the 
continuum of responsibility Hershey lies. And this case would then provide an excellent 
juridical vehicle for the Court of Chancery to clarify the obligations of Delaware 
corporations acting globally. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 This Court should compel the defendant to grant the plaintiff’s § 220 inspection 
request. 
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